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A Geographer's Prance 
Through the incessant conflicts, changes of regime, 
alterations of national power structure, and varying issues of 
twentieth-century France, one surprising constant prevails: 
generally speaking, France's routines of popular contention in the 
1980s followed the same essential patterns as they had a century 
earlier. Despite dramatic social change in most areas of life, 
popular politics held to the forms that came to prevail during the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century. That generalization 
holds across regions whose twentieth-century trajectories ran 
quite differently. The task of this paper is to document the 
continuities in Flanders, Burgundy, Languedoc, Anjou, and the Ile 
de France from the end of the nineteenth century to the 1980s. 
In his great geography of France, Paul Vidal de la Blache 
linked the living country of 1900 or so with the experience of 
that corner of the earth's surface during many millennia.  he 
history of a people," he declared, "is inseparable from the land 
that it inhabits" (Vidal 1908: 1) . ~ccordingly, he mapped out 
regions neither in terms of historic political divisions nor 
strictly according to physical features. Instead, he looked for 
roughly-bounded niches that promoted coherent, interdependent 
rounds of human life. 
vidal's "Flanders", as a practical matter, covered the whole 
set of plains between the Ardennes and the coastal marshes' -- 
Hainaut, Cambresis, pieces of Artois and Picardy, plus most of the 
historical province of Flanders. Yet when Vidal arrived at the 
description of Flanders, he seemed dismayed by the smoky brick 
towns its people had laid down. "On this terrain," he pointed 
out , 
each historical era has raised new ranges of cities; some of 
them disappeared while others began, but the creation of 
cities has never ended. The subsoil took its turn. It was 
toward 1846 that the search for coal deposits, already begun 
around Valenciennes a century earlier, arrived at Lens and 
Bethune. Beside the unified small-scale city formed a type 
previously unknown, the industx ial agglomeration. Around the 
pitheads whose strange silhouettes stippled Lens's 
agricultural  lain ligned up rows of corons in eights or 
tens: sad, identical little houses, built at the same moment 
to contain , existences that multiplied like ciphers. 
Sometimes the contrast is striking: valenciennes, 
identifiable from afar (as in -the paintings of Van der 
Meulen) by means of its elegant steeples and major buildings, 
gathers its narrow streets around a central square; but just 
outside its gates, like a growth, spreads an enormous 
unconnected set of suburbs with their rows of houses, bars, 
and factories (vidal 1908: 79-80) . 
It was as if people had decided to deny their natural heritage. 
Vidal found Languedoc less artificial. Languedoc, in vidal's 
analysis, organized around a giant channel: plains and valleys 
that had once lain under a sea, flanked by hills that had been its 
shores. "That corridor ," he wrote, 
where Roman road and .royal highway, canal and railway crowd 
each " other, was a passageway , of peoples. To be sure, 
connections between Lower Languedoc and the rural regions of 
Toulouse or Albi were not exclusively concentrated in that 
passageway. Via S,aint-Pons, ~gdarieux, and Le Vigan, there 
always were relations based on the needs of exchange between 
mountain and plain. These small-scale connections, resulting 
from the juxtaposition of contrasting terrains, play a v&ry 
large part in southern life (Vidal 1908: 324). 
One could still, said Vidal, read the ancient landscape in the 
twentieth-century terrain of ~an~uedoc. 
vidal's scheme of natural regions denied Anjou any unity: the 
old,province spanned the eastern and southern edges of the Breton 
massif, the western edge of paris' basin, and the Loire valley. 
Approaching . Anjou from Touraine, Vidal offered a sketch that ' 
shaped many a later description: "Down below, abundance an.d easy 
living; up above, the beginning of the rough, poor' life of the 
West's frontiers; a contrast whose reality the struggles of the 
Revolution help us appreciate" (Vidal 190'8: 155). He wrote again 
of the rolling highland to the south that 
borders the Loire valley with a continuous shelf. Above the 
smiling valley, that stiff- bluff, topped by old, high 
villages, forms a threatening wall. That was the limit of 
the old region called the Mauges, basically rural even in its 
industries, more Poitou than Anjou and, despite long 
commercial connections with the sea, hostile to the urban 
life of the river's bank. The region showed its character in 
1793 (Vida,l 1908: 288). 
vidal believed in continuities. 
Burgundy followed another passageway. It united plains and 
hills: a "crossroads of, Europe," ~ i d a l  called the region (Vidal 
1908: 216). Connections between east and west, . between the 
Parisian basin and the Saone valley,'between the Mediterranean and 
the North Sea made of Burgundy, in Vidal's estimation, a natural 
site,for commercial agriculture, military activity, and cultural 
creativity. Furthermore, the distribution of rivers and good soil 
favored the development of dense, well-connected settlements. 
Once again agriculture dominated the analysis; the mining and 
manufacturing that were growing at Burgundy's edges almost escaped 
vidal's attention. In his view, the blue-ribbon winegrowing and 
commercialized wheat farming of Burgundy fulfilled the region's 
vocation. 
 acing paris and the Ile de France, Vidal could not blink the 
importance of human intervention. "The surroundings of Paris," he 
observed, "have always had an animated, lively air that Rome 
always lacked and Berlin lacks still. Today the great city sends 
out its front line of houses; they precede it like an army on the 
march, which invades the plain, cli.mbs the heights, envelops whole 
hills. But in the old days towns and villages, of which a number 
have been absorbed into the growing city, led an independent 
existence, due. to local conditions which favored the development 
of little groupings everywhere'.' (Vidal 1908: 130). Then Vidal 
gave up the effort to analyze the city. "1t is enough," he 
concluded, "to have studied where and how the seed of the future 
being was planted, how a lively plant grew that no stormy wind 
could uproot, and to have shown that in its vitality one can feel 
powerful sap coming from the soil, and a knotting of roots so well 
established in every direction that no one can dig them up or cut . 
them allot (Vidal 1908: 133) . 
As he closed his book, however, Vidal began to wonder whether 
the growth of Paris had deprived provincial France of its 
nutriments. "Connections between Paris and the provinces abound," 
he mused, "but to the detriment of the ties that the provinces 
once had to each other. Thus the fruitful relations that existed . 
between the East and West of our country, from the Alps to the 
-~tlantic,' have diminished so much that they are now hardly more. 
than an historical memory". (Vidal 1908: 348). An artificially 
centralized country, he thought, ran the risk of losing the tough, 
adaptive genius that still resided in France's peasantry. 
A Population Transformed 
Where was that peasantry? vidal wrote his reflections at the 
start of the twentieth century. By even the broadest definition, 
however, peasants were then no longer France's dominant 
population. In 1901, France's labor force included about 19.7 
million people. 8.2 million owners, renters, sharecroppers, 
wage-laborers, and others -- 43 percent of the labor force -- 
worked in agriculture. Agriculture was still the largest single 
sector, . but a majority of the ' labor force worked in , 
non-agricultural jobs. The remaining 11.5 million workers divided 
almost evenly between manufacturing and services, with a little 
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left over for mining, fishing, forestry, and a few other 
extractive industries. Manufacturing did not actually outstrip 
agriculture until the 1950s. 
Yet a plurality in agriculture was not enough to make France 
a peasant country. Within the agricultural labor force of 1901, 
only a minority held land as .owners, renters, or sharecroppers. 
More than half the people in agriculture were wage-workers: hired 
hands, day-laborers, servants. 
Consider these departmental figures for the male agricultural 
labor force of 1901 (source: 1901 census) : 
heads of workers 
estab- in estab- individual heads/ 
department lishments 1 ishments workers total total 
Aude 21,390 29,829 13,934 65,153 32.8% 
c8te dl or 20,415 21,794 18,470 60,679 33.6 
Haute-Garonne 34,204 24,680 16,003 , 74,887 45.7 
~6rault 25,061 34,528 24,905 84,494 29.7 
Maine-et-Loire 39,246 37,975 19,003 96,224 40.8 
Nord 23,810 50,820 24,951 99,581 23.9 
~aGne-et-Loire . 45,215 38,464 26,408 110,087 41.1 
ALL FRANCE 2,028,955 2,151,623 1,396,674 5,577,252 36.4 
"Heads of establishments" included owners, tenants, and 
-sharecroppers. "Individual workers" were mainly day-laborers, 
while "workers in establishments" covered hired hands, overseers, 
and working family members. Areas of household tenant farming in 
Haute-Garonne and Maine-et-Loire, plus the fine-wine region of 
Saone-et-~oire, topped the national average for heads of 
establishment. Areas of semi-industrial winemaking such as Aude 
and Herault, on the other hand, had relatively high proportions of 
hired labor. For very proletarian agricultural labor, one went to 
Flanders and the Ile de France; in Nord, Seine-et-Marne, and 
Seine-et-Oise, three quarters of the males in agriculture worked 
for a wage of one sort or another. 
Although some of those wage-earners were children of peasants 
who would eventually take over farms of their own, most of them 
failed to qualify as peasants by any criterion. During the 
century (as in the latter half of the nineteenth century), 
wage-workers left agriculture faster than smallholders did. As a 
consequence, owner-operators and substantial leaseholders 
represented a growing proportion of a shrinking. sector. 
Nevertheless, more and more of . those owner-operators and 
leaseholders came to organize their lives like small -- or -even 
large -- businessmen rather than peasants. In short, according to 
a generous standard something like a fifth of French households 
were peasants in 1901. They kept on dwindling. By 1982, fewer 
than a twentieth of all households were peasants. 
Following World War. I, the French agricultural population 
stopped increasing after centuries of slow but sustained growth. 
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In fact, the whole French labor force stopped expanding in the 
1920s. It then contracted sharply until the 1960s. That shift 
accented a long-term trend in France: a decline in the share of 
the total population engaged in productive labor; retirement, 
unemployment, and increasing school enrollments, coupled with 
negligible natural increase and general aging of the population, 
all contributed to the shrinkage. By the end of the 1970s, with 
accelerated growth of the total population, the national labor 
force had returned to approximately its size in 1921. Figure 1 
tells the story (Sources: Toutain 1963, table 57; censuses of 
1962, 1968, and 1975; INSEE 1981) . 

Figure 1 also shows the . relative growth of three large 
sectors from about 1785 to 1981. (Warning: Before 1856, estimates 
are very rough.) Until , the 1920s, manufacturing, mining, and 
construction' (which the French often sum up as "industry") 
collectively increased a bit more rapidly than services (here 
including trade, transport, government, the professions, rentiers, 
unclassifiable occupations, and other small fringes of the 
economy) . Services only began to expand faster than agriculture, 
forestry, and fisheries after 1900. Following World War I, as 
agriculture skidded, industry and services occupied more and more 
of the French economy. From the 1950s onward, the size of the 
manufacturing labor force stabilized. It was the service sector's 
turn to grow. By 1981, more than half of France's labor force 
worked in services. A legendary country of peasants had vanished. 
A legendary nation of industrial workers was also fading away. 
The transformation took contrasting forms in different 
regions. To see the comparison, let us put the evidence together 
in terms of the regions used in recent censuses. Figure 2 
displays the divisions (Sources: censuses of 1901; 1946, 1975). 
Translated into the departmental names and divisions of 1901, 
today' s "Paris Region" includes the Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and 
Seine-et Marne. The Nord joins its similar neighbor in the region 
called Nord/Pas-de-Calais. The historic province of Languedoc 
I -  occupies major parts of two twentieth-century census regions: 
Languedoc-Rousillon (Aude, Gard, ~6rault, ~ozgre, pyrgn6es- 

~rientales) and ~idi-~yrgnges (Arisge, Aveykon, Haute-Garonne, 
Gers, Loz&re, Tarn, Tarn-et-Garonne) . The Loire region combines 
~oire-~nfgrieure (now Loire-~tlantique, after the de Gaulle 
republic eliminated all inferiority from departmental names), 
Maine-et-~oire, Mayenne, Sarthe, and ~endge. The census Burgundy, 
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finally, covers c6te dgOrf ~i;vre, Saone-et-~oire, and Yonne. 
Of these regions, only Paris saw an increase in its labor 
force from 1901 to 1975. The labor force of Nord/Pas-de-Calais 
remained more or less constant, while those ,of the four other 
regions declined. In every region, workers in agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing declined, especially after 1946. No region 
had a significant increase in its manufacturing labor force; in 
most regions, it diminished noticeably. (The numbers hide, to be 
sure, a substantial net movement of workers into larger, more 
heavily-capitalized firms and into nationalized industries.) 
Service industry made the great gains; in the paris region 
service workers rose from about 1.1 million in 1901 to 3.2 million 
in 1975; services thereby became by far the dominant sector in and 
around the capital. In the process, the paris region captured an 
even larger share of the national labor force. In 1901, the 
region lodged 2.6 million of France's 19.7 million workers, for 13 
percent of the total. The comparable area included 16 percent of 
the national labor force in 1946, and a full 22 percent in 1975. 
Proportionately speaking, Burgundy, the Loire region, and the 
two Languedocs kept more of their labor forces in agriculture than 
did the Paris region or Nord-Pas-de-Calais. By the 1970s, 
nevertheless, the textiles and mining of the Nord were collapsing. 
Despite much .wringing of hands about the capital's dominance and 
despite frequent announcements of decentralization as governmental 
policy, the contrast sharpened: labor, capital, manufacturing, and 
expensive facilities concentrated in the Ile de France. With a 
few localized exceptions (such as steel mills, aircraft 
manufacturing, and nuclear power plants), the rest of France 
specialized increasingly in services, lighter industry, and what 
remained of agriculture. 
Strike Trends 
Over the century before 1975, both in the Ile de France and 
elsewhere, French workers built more and more extensive 
organization. One consequence was a rising propensity to strike. 
From the legalization of the strike in 1864, strikes grew 
enormously more frequent. While strikes in the 1870s ranged from 
40 to 150 -per year throughout France, government reports for the 
1970s -- which excluded agricultural and public-sector conflicts 
-- itemized from 3,000 to 5,000 strikes per year. In a century, 
strikes had become forty or fifty times more frequent. 
Figure 3 presents annual totals of strikers from 1865 through 
1981 (Sources: Perrot 1974: I, 61; Statistique des Greves 
1890-1935; Annuaire Statistique de la France 1966, 1969, 1970, 
1982; International Labour Organization Year Book of Labor 
Statistics 1951-2, 1957, 1966, 1969; Delale & '~agache 1978: 

226-227; Durand & Harff 1973). The graph clearly points upward. 
Over the very long run from the 1860s to the 1960s, the annual 
number of strikers increased at a rate of about 5 percent Per 
year. In the average year of the later 1860s, some 27,000 French 
workers went out on strike. By the later 1960s, the 
characteristic number was 2.5 million workers. Corrected for the 
changing size of the labor force, those numbers correspond to a 
rise from roughly 200 strikers per 100,000 workers to 11,000 per 
100,000. In an average year of the 1870s, roughly one worker in 
five hundred joined a strike. By the 1960s the equivalent of 
about one worker out of ten was striking each year. 
But t.he increase came amid wide year-to-year swings. The 
rise occurred in'spurts centered on strike waves, including those 
of 1906, 1919, 1936, 1948, and 1968. Repression and depression 
both held strikes back; times of repression such as those of the 
two world wars and times of depression such as the mid-1870s and 
the early 1930s generally saw very few strikes. 
At the departmental level, comparable, continuous evidence on 
strike activity. is hard to find. In 1885 French governmental 
officials began publishing comprehensive statistics ,on strike 
activity. By the 1890s, the routine was working well; it reported 
the great bulk of strikes from all of France in considerable 
detail. ~espite lapses such as the incomplete reporting of World 
War 1's industrial conflicts, the system lasted until the strike 
wave of 1936. The giant strikes of the Popular Front shattered 
the series. Since then, official French strike statistics have 
staggered from bad to worse -- fragmentary in the later 1930s, 
non-existent during World War 11, scattered in the postwar years, 
broken again by the strike wave of 1968, confined to a dwindling 
private sector in the 1970s. 
Figure 4 takes advantage of the golden half-century of strike 
reporting from 1885 to 1935. It compares rates of strike activity 
over five departments and France as a whole (Sources: Statistique 
Annuelle 1885-1889; Statistique des Greves 1890-1935). With a few 
interesting exceptions, the graphs separate Nord and Seine from 
the rest of France. Anjou's textile and quarry workers 
occasionally raised Maine-et-Loire's rate of strikers per 100,000 
workers well above the national average. TO some degree, workers 
of .&te d'or, Haute-Garonne, and Maine-et-Loire all joined the 
national strike movement following World War I. Yet through most 
of the fifty years it was the Seine and, especially, the Nord that 
brought up the national average. 
Because the Seine and the Nord had so many more workers in 
their labor forces than the other departments, these higher strike 
propensities meant that the Seine, or the Nord, or both together, 
commonly brought out a majority of entire country's strikers. The 
strike movement of 1890, for example, concentrated very heavily in 
the coal basin of the Nord and the neighboring Pas-de-Calais. In 
1906, the strike wave began in the north, only to envelop the 
Paris region. By then, however, strike waves were becoming 

national in scope. ~lthough Flanders and the Ile de France still 
contributed the largest numbers in 1906, high proportions of 
workers in the ~editerranean coastal area and the region of Lyon 
likewise struck. 
That pattern stuck. The geography of 1919-1920 resembled 
that of 1906, although overall levels of participation ran much 
higher. In 1936, when the vast majority of French departments had 
participation rates above, 2,000 strikers .per 100,000 workers, 
France's northeast corner, including the Nord, still led the pack. 
After World War 11, the 'thinness of strike statistics makes it 
more difficult to follow the geography as closely as before. In 
the great strike waves of 1947-48 and 1968, never.theless, 
metalworkers of the paris region and miners of the Nord stood out 
in the action. As strike waves rose and nationalized, workers 
along the old axis from Paris to Lille continued to play a 
' disproportionate part. 
A Concatenation of Crises 
The conflicts of 1906 promoted and dramatized a 
. nationalization of strike movements that was already under way. 
They occurred in the midst of a great series of national 
struggles. During the years from 1905 to 1907, organized 
industrial workers made their presence in national politics known 
as never before. Despite the nonpartisan stance of the CGT, the 
arrival of a strong socialist party in the Chamber of Deputies 
gave labor much a much more direct voice in government than it had 
ever before enjoyed. 
But the struggles of labor, capital, and government were only 
part of the story. From the beginning of the century, 
smallholders and wage-workers in Languedoc's winefields were 
mounting strikes, protests, and demands for government help. In 
1907, they joined together in a movement that shook the whole 
'country. From 1902 onward, furthermore, a succession of 
republican governments started circumscribing the place of the 
Catholic Church in national life: canceling the salaries the 
government had paid priests since Napoleon's Concordat, closing 
religious schools, then enacting a definitive separation between 
church and state. At each step, organized Catholics resisted. 
Catholic resistance reached its peak in February and March 
1906. To prepare for the assignment of church property to the 
religious associations newly required by the law, the government 
sent emissaries to take official inventories of that property. In 
town after town, the faithful occupied their local church and 
drove off the officials. In Paris, Action Francaise leagued with 
local people to barricade Sainte-Clotilde and Saint-Pierre- 
du-Gros-Caillou. Elsewhere in France, the activists were more 
often ordinary parishioners, with a sprinkling of local notables. 
In general, active involvement of a locality in the 
resistance depended on the presence of two. elements: well- 
established Catholic practice and spirited local leadership. That 
combination appeared most frequently in Brittany and the adjacent 
areas of western France. Secondary centers of resistance, 
however, developed in northern Languedoc and neighboring areas 
(the bloc of departments including Aveyron, Lozsre, and 
Haute-~oire) and a few scattered departments including the Nord. 
The geography of resistance anticipated later Catholic boycotting 
of public schools. In 1957, the twelve French departments with 
more than 30 percent of their primary school children in Catholic 
schools were ~orbihan, -1lle-et-vilaine, Loire-~nf&rieure, ~endge, 
Maine-et-Loire, Mayenne, Finistgre, Aveyron, LozGre, ~rdache, 
Haute-Loire, and ~o*tes-du-~ord (Mayeur 1966a: 1272) . The 
correspondence between the maps of 1906 and 1957 is well-nigh 
perfect . 
Among our five regions, Anjou and the 'Nord joined most 
actively in the movement. The Ile de France and Languedoc had a 
marginal involvement, and Burgundy remained indifferent. 
Thereafter, Anjou and the Nord went separate ways. In Anjou, the 
struggle for and against the established church congealed into a 
long-term political division. There, the clericals generally kept 
the upper hand. As in the adjacent vendge, the choice of schools 
became a bitter; visible political choice. 
In the Nord as' well, inventories divided communities. In 
a Tourcoing, for example, socialist workers went through the streets 
breaking the windows of factories whose owners they suspected of 
having supplied the bales of cloth with which Catholics had 
barricaded local churches (Mayeur 1966a: 1265). Nevertheless, in 
the Nord and elsewhere the great majority of inventories proceeded 
peacably. By April 1906 the Nord's great divide did not separate 
Catholics from Republicans. It drew the line betwe'en organized 
workers and capitalists. 
An American Insect 
The second great crisis that opened the century followed a 
very different geography. The troubles 'of French winegrowers 
between 1900 and 1910 had. their origins two decades earlier. 
Enterprising growers of ~fmes' hinterland introduced hardy, 
high-production American vines in the 1880s, hoping to raise their 
own yields. The roots of American vines carried a microscopic 
insect, phylloxera vastatrix, to which they were immune but French 
vines were not. True to its name, the blight devastated French 
winefields. The terrible task began: tearing up all the nation's 
vineyards, and planting resistant American vines. To hold their 
markets, merchants and large producers tolerated or even 
encouraged two practices they would later condemn bitterly: first, 
the importation of cheap wine from Spain, Italy and, especially, 
Algeria; second, the stretching of the available stock by 
judicious addition of water and sugar. 
- 
As the South recovered, its larger owners and merchants 
responded to new competition by shifting toward large-scale 
production of ordinary wines. Shipment of wine by railroad tank 
car made it easier to reach the national market, but gave the 
advantage to large producers of reliable, low-priced wine. That 
meant concentration of capital and proletarianization of labor. 
During the 1880s, for example, the Compagnie des Salins du Midi 
built itself from nothing into one of the country's great wine 
producers. By 1900, the CSM had more than 700 hectares of Herault 
in grapes. In its holdings, its industrial methods produced about 
twice the department's average yield of wine per hectare. The 
firm was turning out 100,000 hectoliters in good years, and 
averaging on the order of 10 percent profit per year on its 
capital (Pech n.d. : 153-178) . 
From year to year, the prosperity of Languedoc's wine 
industry depended on the national market price for cheap wine, 
which varied mainly as a (negative) function of the previous 
year's national production. During most of the years from 1900 to . 
1906, prices were depressed and winegrowers' incomes declin'ing. 
Three different conflicts overlapped temporarily with each other: 
All producers, large and small, felt the. competition of cheap 
wines from elsewhere. Organized producers cried against "fraud" 
(as exemplified by watering, the use of beet sugar to fortify 
wine, and the sale of untaxed wine) and called for governmental 
intervention. Smallholders saw themselves being squeezed by 
capitalist winegrowers. They complained about taxes, bankruptcy 
laws, and unfair competition. Meanwhile, wage-laborers felt the 
pressures of underemployment and declining wages. Some of them 
formed unions and organized strikes. 
During the concentration and proletarianization of the 1890s, 
scattered winegrowers' unions had formed in zones of large-scale 
production. ~n 1904, workers in southern winefields attracted 
national attention 'with a moderately successful round of strikes 
against major producers; in pyr;n6es Orientales (especially near 
Perpignan) , Aude (especially near Narbonne) and Herault 
(especially near Beziers and in the sections closest to Narbonne), 
129 growers' strikes occurred during the year (Gratton 1971: 164). 
In 1907, however, the three currents -- large producers, 
smallholders, and wage-workers -- flowed together. Deputies from 
winegrowing regions organized a January debate on "fraud" in 
winegrowing, and launched a parliamentary inquiry into the 
question. In March, the parliamentary commission came to Nimes. 
Rapidly local winegrowers' committees began meeting and 
complaining. Grower and innkeeper  arce ell in Albert of Argelliers, 
who had been trying to organize winegrowers' action committees for 
several years, now reached responsive audiences. 
On 11 March a fateful series of processions began: About 90 
winegrowers marched from Argelliers to Narbonne, where the 
parliamentary commission was sitting. Then marches multiplied. 
Although large growers sometim~s gave their blessing and regular 
wage-workers sometimes joined the action, the core of the movement 
consisted of two overlapping groups: smallholders and those 
skilled vineworkers who split their effort between tending their 
own small plots and working for wages on other people's (Smith 
1978). They organized village by village, then consolidated into 
regional federations. 
By May the meeting-demonstrations were converging on the 
regional capitals -- Narbonne, Bgziers, Carcassonne, ~?mes, 
Montpellier -- and attracting hundreds of thousands of 
participants. Sundays were the gr'eat days. On Sunday 5 May, 
roughly 45,000 people arrived in Narbonne from 150 villages. 
Perhaps 150,000 came to Beziers on 12 May, 170,000 to ~erpignan on 
19 May, 250,000 to Carcassonne on 26 May, 150,000 to ~ t m e s  on 2 
June. On 9 June, the mass meeting of Montpellier -- some 500,000 
participants from an estimated 430 villages -- topped the series 
(Smith 1978: 118). The marches were among the most colorful of 
the twentieth century. Symbolic objects displayed during 
demonstrations included: 
portraits of Marcellin Albert, prophet's beard and all 
little guillotines with the words FOR CHEATERS or DEATH TO 
CHEATERS 
little gallows with cheaters or sugarbeets hanging in them 
vines, draped in black 
a scythe with threats of death to cheaters 
empty purses and turned-out empty pockets 
official notices of tax sales inscribed RESULT OF FRAUD 
'a sardine labeled THE PEOPLE'S PITTANCE 
a bottle bedecked with mourning crepe 
a little coffin with the sign WINEGROWER, MY FRIEND, ARE YOU 
READY? I'VE COME FOR YOU. 
a piece of bread on a sign, draped with mourning crepe, 
reading LOU DARNIE CROUSTET (the last crust) (Gibert 1970: 
Some of the demonstrations (for instance, at the Perpignan 
railroad station on 8 June) spilled over into confrontations with. 
troops and police. Meanwhile, the winegrowers' committee of 
~rgelliers, led by Marcellin Albert, organized a tax strike backed 
by the resignation of hundreds of municipal councils in Aude, 
~grault, and ~~re/n6es-0rientales. 'clgmenceau sent. in troops. 
The arrival of military forces in Narbonne, Montpellier, 
Perpignan, Agde, and other cities precipitated a new round of 
demonstrations and attacks. But these new battles were manned 
largely by ci ty-dwellers rather than wi'negrowers (Smith 1978 : 
118-119). While the government was arresting Marcellin Albert and 
members of his committee for their advocacy of resistance, the 
National Assembly was passing laws against watering and undue 
sugaring of wines. 
~t summer s end, the par tly-succ~essful movement began to 
disband. Some- of the participants formed a General ~inegrowers' 
Confederation, modeled on the CGT. (To the later chagrin of many 
socialists and labor leaders, it united smallholders and skilled 
workers in a common demand for protection of their livelihoods. A 
proletarian party found itself depending on a petty-bourgeois 
following. Nevertheless, from' 1908 to 1911 organized vineworkers 
succeeded in a series of strikes to raise wages). 
Meanwhile, a beleaguered government was releasing its 
prisoners and dropping its charges. Once again a movement had 
ended with the tacit amnesty that usually sealed success, however 
partial. 
Proletarians and Others 
Burgundy's winegrowers did not join the movement of 1907. 
While substantial clusters of vineyard strikes were occurring in 
Languedoc during the decade after 1900, in fact, not a single one 
appeared in Burgundy. In July 1907, the prefect of the c2te d'Or 
commented, rather smugly, that  h he events of the Midi dominated 
political concerns in my department during the month of June 1907. 
The people of c6te dlOr received the news of the troubles in those 
departments with more surprise and curiosity than sympathy" 
(Archives ~gpartementales chote d'Or, dijon: 20 M 60).  h he 
difference ,stemmed lakgely from contrasting responses to 
phylloxera two decades earlier. On the whole, the Midi's 
winegrowers had moved their industry. to mass production of cheap 
table wines from hardy American plants. 1n the process, 
wage-labor became the dominant mode. 
In Burgundy, smallholders and larger producers alike had 
chosen to reconstitute high-quality production by grafting French 
plants on immune American roots. The skill required for that 
operation and the subsequent care of the vines gave smallholders 
and wage-workers leverage their southern confreres lost. Swings 
in production, demand, and prices did not affect them so greatly. 
The contrast between industrial and artisanal forms of winegrowing 
I accentuated. 
Later and elsewhere, smallholders and skilled agricultural 
workers proved perfectly capable of collective action. When the 
winegrowers of Champagne met their crisis in 1911, for example, 
small producers led the attacks on big merchants, participated 
actively in tax strikes, and joined the demand for governmental 
action against "fraud". Yet thereafter, in Champagne as 
elsewhere, wage-workers moved toward the organization of unions 
and strikes, while smallholders split off in the direction of 
cooperatives and pressure groups. 
~t a national scale, to be sure, agricultural workers never 
played a very large part either in strike activity or in trade 
union federations. Through the entire hi;tory of French strike 
statistics, agricultural workers hardly ever contributed more than 
5 percent of all French strikes or strikers. In the years from 
* 1890 to 1935, while the non-agricultural labor force as a whole 
turned out strikes at about 60 per year per million workers, 
agriculture produced about 3 per million. During the earlier 
decades of the twentieth century,'wage-workers in relatively large 
mines and manufacturing firms constituted the core of French 
industrial confl-ict. 
The mining and textile towns of the Nord provide some of the 
purest examples. Take Halluin, a factory town 17 kilometers due 
north of ~iile. Halluin stands on the frontier, directly across 
the Lys river from the ~elgian fortress city of   en in. With the 
mechanization of linen spinning during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century, the village of Halluin filled in quickly as a 
compact city of small shops and domestic weavers. Its shops sent 
linen goods to merchants in Lille. In the 1880s, local 
entrepreneurs built steam-driven weaving mills; mills came to 
dominate the cityscape. People flocked in from the Belgian 
countryside -- many of them becoming permanent residents, but 
several thousand more crossing the border to work each day. 
Flemish became an everyday language. 
~alluin grew to about 16,000 inhabitants, not counting the 
daily commuters or the dwindling number in surrounding villages on 
both sides of the border who wove and did other forms of outwork 
for the city1 s industry. It remained near .that figure past World 
War 11. The inhabitants lived, for the most part, in tight rows 
of low, uniform two- or three-room houses built along narrow 
streets, courtyards, or culs-de-sac -- the very environment Vidal 
de la Blache deplored. Like other working-class towns in the 
Nord, Halluin organized a great deal of its public life around its 
.corner bars, the estaminets; in 1901, the city had one cafe for 
every eleven houses (vermander 1978: 35). Halluin kept the 
appearance and .condition of a nineteenth-century mill town. In 
1968, for example, only 34 percent of the city's dwellings had a 
bath or shower, and only 19 percent had an inside toilet (Bruyelle 
1976: 59). 
A constant population and 'a fixed environment, however, did 
not mean a silent people. In the 1890s, the strike-prone workers 
of Halluin and its Belgian suburbs organized a socialist union and 
a Bourse . du ~ravail. In the next decade, local organizers 
followed the Belgian model by maintaining two rival labor unions, 
one Catholic,the other anticlerical and socialist. Now and then 
they cooperated. When union recognition became an issue during 
the big, long weavers' strike of 1909-1910, for instance, the two 
camps joined forces, and won. Over the long run, however, the 
secular socialists squeezed their rivals into a corner. Halluin 
unified to the left. 
The leftward unification played itself out in local politics. 
Until World War I, local capitalists kept control of the 
municipality; the mayor was typically a textile entrepreneur. 
From 1919 onward, however, Socialists and Communists took . charge. 
With the split of the national labor federation in 1922, the 
Communist-affiliated CGTU became the dominant local union, During 
the general textile strikes of 1928-29 and 1931, the CGTU led the 
way. In the course of the huge regional strike of 1931, the 
Journal des Debats ran a typical story: 
A Communist parade of 400 people took place Thursday 
afternoon in the main streets of Halluin. During the march, 
a number of incidents occurred. Mobile guards were insulted 
and shoved by a number of demonstrators, Two young women 
workers were arrested, as well as a male striker from Menin. 
The demonstrators left the march little by little after the 
arrests; the parade finally fell apart for lack of 
demonstrators. Following these incidents, the prefect of the 
Nord issued a decree forbidding all parades in the towns of 
the ~ o r d  (Journal des ~Gbats 11 September 1930). 
Strike, parade, and demonstration converged. 
Although the CGTU and the CGT had rejoined forces by the time 
of the 1936 sitdown strikes, the Communist forces remained strong 
at Halluin. Indeed, Halluin was one of the few places in the Nord 
(or, for that matter, anywhere else) where the Communist call for 
a general strike on 30 November 1938 received a wide response. 
The distinction between labor struggles and national politics 
declined. Halluin became famous as "red city". 
By the 1930s, Halluin belonged to one of the country's 
densest clusters of red cities. Consider the nationwide 
strikes/demonstrations of 12 February 1934, when the left showed 
i,ts strength in response to the Parisian right-wing demonstrations 
of 6 February, and the PCF broke out of its isolation to join 
,-. 
other left parties. Despite the failure of the Nord's Communists 
and Socialists to achieve unity of action, the Nord produced more 
individual demonstrations than any other department of France. 
~ o t  all were peaceful; in and around Roubaix, Communist strikers 
blocked the frontier to keep 2,000 Belgians from coming to work, 
stoned their buses, spread paving stones across the road, burned a 
truck, broke in to sack a carding plant whose workers. were not 
striking, and fought those workers in the street. Unionized 
workers likewise struggled with non-strikers in Abscon and 
~unkerque. The same day, Lille, Roubaix, and Tourcoing together 
brought out roughly 25,000 marchers in three separate 
demonstrations against fascism. That compares with perhaps 65,000 
in Paris, . 32,500 in Toulouse, 6,500 in Montpellier, 1,600 in 
Dijon, 2,000 in Angers (Lefranc 1965:33; Prost 1966: 27). 
Despite the failure to bring out a unified left in such 
departments as the Nord, the demonstration-strikes of 12 February 
gave a premonition of the themes and geography of the Popular 
Front. On the May Days of 1936, 1937, and 1938, for example, the 
Seine, Seine-et-Oise, and Nord again led the country for sheer 
numbers of demonstrations (Prost 1964: 91). Some further 
indications of the geography appear in this table (~our'ce: Prost 
1964: 214-219; Bulletin du ~inist&re du ~ravail 1936; 1936 census; 
in good French style, the "percent voting left" refers to all 
registered voters, including those.who did not vote at all)': 
PERCENT OF 
WORKERS AND PERCENT OF PERCENT STRIKERS 
OFFICIALS METALWORKERS VOTING PER 
UNIONIZED IN: UNIONIZED LEFT 100,000 WORKERS, 
DEPARTMENT 1936 1937 IN 1938 IN 1936 JUNE 1936 
Haute-Garonne 22 58 . 33 4 6 4678 
Nord 15 57 8 4 47 37'838 
Seine + 13 78 7 2 4 3 12639 
Seine-et-Oise 
ALL FRANCE 11 60 60 29 9036 
One fact stands out: As the Popular Front gained momentum and 
strikes spread, workers rushed into unions. Over the whole 
country, the rate of unionization almost sextupled from one year 
to the next. Strike waves had always promoted union affiliation 
in France, but the wave of 1936 had an extraordinary mobilizing 
effect. Again, over France as a whole nearly one worker in ten 
struck in June 1936 -- and the base for these rates is the total 
labor force, including agricultural workers, professionals, 
executives, shopkeepers, and everyone else. Although the rates 
for ~ 6 t e  door, Haute-Garonne, and Maine-et-Loire ran below those 
for the country as a whole, those departments still had very high 
strike participation by ordinary standards; from 1.2 to 6.2 
percent of their workforces joined strikes in June 1936. 
Practically every French' department (and certainly all of 
these) had at least some sitdown strikes in June 1936. The 
Haute-Garonne, despite its relatively low strike rate in June 
1936, had the distinction of helping to initiate the national 
movement; the sitdown strike at Toulouse's ~atscozre factory (13 
May) began in response to the firing of workers who had taken off 
the First of May; from 27 May onward, many other Toulousan plants 
followed the example. 
With respect to unionization and strike activity, the Nord 
and the Paris region stand out from ~ s t e  dVOr, Haute-Garonne and 
Maine-et-~oire; the combination of relatively high unionization, 
left voting, and extensive sitdowns, mark them as bastions of 
working-class activism. 
In the logic of French politics, working-class activism also 
made the Nord and the Paris region favored sites of confrontation 
between fragments of the left; when they were not caught 
temporarily in a tight alliance, both in the 1930s and later 
Communists and Socialists (or their union counterparts) often 
battled each other. By a similar logic, the Nord and the Paris 
region had a disproportionate share of public ?truggles between 
organized leftists and activists of .the right: Action Fran~aise, 
Croix de Feu and other authoritarian groupings before World War 
11, Gaullists, supporters of French Algeria, Poujadists, and 
others after the war. 
Yet no region lacked for left-right clashes. During the 
national pulling and hauling between Gaullists and Communists 
. . 
during the spring of 1948, for instance, communists tried 
repeatedly to sabotage public meetings of the Gaullist RPF. In 
Toulouse, on 21 March, three or four hundred Communists managed to 
enter among the 1500 in the audience. When the speaker began to 
, attack their party, the Communists started a demonstration in the 
midst of the meeting, shouting and singing the Internationale. 
Gaullists naturally replied with their own shouts and the 
Marseillaise. As the meeting's marshals tried to expel the 
demonstrators, the predictable fight broke out. Some of the 
combattants used brass knuckles ("coups-de-poing am&ricainsV), 
blackjacks, and switchblades. BY the time riot police had arrived 
and cleared the hall, 16 people (8 Communists, 5 RPF, and 3 
policemen) were seriously wounded, another 50 or so cut and 
bruised. Later, the meeting resumed under police protection (Le 
Monde 23 March 1948; Le Figaro 23 March 1948)'. Some variant of 
Toulouse's scenario recurred in most of France's cities for 
decades. Wherever fiercely rival parties recruited young 
activists and held public displays of their determination, the 
* 
opponents sometimes came to blows, 
In the first difficult years after the war, likewise, all 
regions saw concerted resistance against government efforts to 
manage the economy, In Di jon, on 21 May 1947, the government's 
invalidation of bread-ration tickets brought a maarch to the 
Prefecture. "Eight thousand storekeepers, industrialists, 
traveling salesmen, members of the professions and workers," 
reported the New York Times, stormed the offices of the economic 
control system in Dijon, burning archives and food tickets and 
smashing furniture and windows" (New York Times 22 May 1947). 
Combat, closer to the scene, wrote of a "monstrous crowd of 
workers" (Combat 22 May 1947). The prefect ordered validation of 
the bread tickets. On 2 July of the same year, workers met in 
Angers at the CGT's call. They deplored the government's wage 
controls. After sending a delegation to see the prefect, 5,000 
people went to demonstrate at the prefecture. When they broke 
into the courtyard, the prefect stalled them by distributing wine 
and butter. The prefect's move, however, did not get rid of the 
demonstrators. Police cleared the prefecture (Le Monde 3 July 
1947). 
Labor-capital con£ licts revived' rapidly after the war, but 
now involved state .officials even more intensely than before. By 
the middle of 1947, France was producing yet another strike wave. 
After the parisian metalworkers' strike of May, general strikes of 
railway workers, miners, and bank employees developed in June and 
July. In ~ovember, the classic pair of ~arisian metalworkers and 
miners of the Nord struck. By the end of the month, there were 
strikes on the railways, in the ports, and in many other 
industries. Sabotage and factory occupations were widespread. 
Strikers took over a number of railroad stations and post offices. 
Around ~gthune, pickets stopped motorists, searched their cars, 
and demanded identity papers. 
The movement of 1947 came close to a general strike in 
Alpes-Maritimes, Gard, ~grault, Haute-Garonne, Tarn-et-Garonne, 
Loire and Allier -- that is, in a bloc of southern departments 
centered on Languedoc. National. and international politics ., 
hovered over the entire strike: in the organization of a strike 
committee based on the PCF and outside the CGT, in the resignation 
of Paul Ramadier's government to make 'way for ~ 6 o n  Blum, in the 
coalition of Communists and right-wing parties to block Blum's 
installation as premier, in the,demand for a nationwide 25 percent 
increase in wages, in the symbolic destruction of English and 
American flags, in the settlement of the strikes by means of a 
national agreement between the strike committee and the 
government. The .workersf movement resembled a revolutionary force 
even more than it had in 1936. 
Embattled Agrarians 
Despite memories of 1907 in Languedoc and of 1911 in 
Champagne, France's farmers almost got lost in the workers' 
mobilizations of the 1920s and 1930s. The except'ions were often 
lively. For example: 
14 January 1933: occupation of the departmental prefecture in 
Chartres by organized farmers from the Beauce 
June 1933: demonstration against the judicial seizure of 
property from'comite de Dgfense Paysanne activist near Amiens 
who refused to collect social insurance payments from his 
employees 
1934 and 1935: series of protest meetings ending in 
confrontations with police and counter-demonstrators 
16 ~ a r c b  1935: collective resistance of farmers to payment of 
market fees.in ~iggac 
throughout 1935: scattered opposition of small distillers 
(bouilleurs de cru) to fiscal controls, involving frequent 
resignations of municipalities in ~ormandy and Brittany 
22 September 1935: bloody fight between members of the Front 
Paysan and Communist counter-demonstrators after a meeting in ' 
Blois on 22 September 1935 
24 November 1935 and 26 January 1936: similar affairs in 
Montpellier and St. Brieuc 
fall 1936 onward: strikes of agricultural laborers, coupled 
with battles between strikers and non-strikers, in the Ile de 
France and the Nord 
June 1938: destruction' of vegetables belonging to 
non-striking farmers by commandos of the Comite .de Dgfense 
Paysanne in  ini is tare 
As compared with the ferment surrounding industrial workers in the 
1930s, these and a few more incidents like them added up to very 
little action by cultivators. 
During those years, collective action by and on behalf of 
French agriculture centered .on four elements which from 1934 to 
1936 consolidated into the Front Paysan: 1) the Union  ati ion ale 
des Syndicats Agricoles led by Jacques Le Roy Ladurie, 2) the 
Parti Agraire of Fleurant Agricola [nom de guerre of Gabriel 
I 
Fleurant], 3) the Comite de Defense Paysanne of Henri ~orgbres 
[pseudonym of Henri dtHalluin], and 4) a set of specialized 
producerst associations, such as the beetgrowerst confederation 
Generale des Betteraviers. All four tended to take extremely 
conservative political lines, prefiguring Vichy's stress on work 
and family. As a practical matter, however they organized 
lobbying and electoral campaigns around price supports and 
protection of the French domestic market. After the Front split 
in 1936, Dorg&rets Jeunesses Paysannes and their paramilitary 
Greenshirts clearly took the lead among self-styled peasant 
organizations. It was they, for example, that supplied shock 
troops to break the harvest strikes begun by day-laborers of' Nord 
and Ile de France in 1936 and 1937. The  ree en shirts paralleled in 
their rural sphere the antileftist activism carried on in cities 
and towns by the Jeunesses Patriotes, the Croix de Feu, and other 
protofascist formations. 
Although none of the collaborating formations survived the ' 
~iberation, Dorg&res himself -- after trial for collaboration, 
conviction, and rehabilitation -- returned to action in 1949. Via 
his newspaper Gazette agricole, he found that there still was a 
rural public for opposition to government controls and taxes. His 
De'fense Paysanne reappeared as a rival of the Parti Paysan, and 
then of the more formidable ~gdgration   at ion ale de Syndicats 
dlExploitants Agricoles (FNSEA). Dorggres once again scored great 
successes in organizing small Norman distillers of apple brandy. 
Dorg5res1 organizational strength concentrated heavily in the band 
from Bordeaux up the Atlantic coast to Anjou, Normandy, and 
~rittany, then along the channel coast to the Nord; that zone 
included the main areas for France.'~ prodution and consumption of 
applejack: Royer 1958: 170-181. 
In the early 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  Dorg&resl followers were meeting to break 
the seals on stills and invade the offices of the national liquor 
authority. In the mid-1950s, Dorggres carried on an uneasy 
courtship with Pierre Poujadels Union de Defense des Commercants 
et Artisans '(UDCA). Together they blocked tax inspections, 
sabotaged official ceremonies, and sacked the offices of tax 
collectors. 
Still, in the postwar years Poujade came much closer than 
Dorgeres to building an effective national movement. Through much 
of the country his UDCA mobilized shopkeepers to block 
governmental fiscal controls. Poujade first attracted national 
attention in July 1953, when he organized resistance to tax 
inspectors in his home town of saint-cgr6, Lot. His organization 
started to gain a broad following in 1954, through its defense of 
shopkeepers in the Southwest, In November 1954, for example, they 
managed to bring out riot police against them in Castelsarrasin, 
Montauban, Rodez, and Toulouse. 
By January 1955, Pou jade was holding a large demonstration 
and addressing a mass meeting in Paris, playing the electoral game 
with one hand as he stirred up shopkeepers' strikes and fiscal . 
resistance with the other. By 1956, with Poujade and fifty of his 
collaborators sitt-ing in the Chamber of Deputies, a significant 
part of the UDCA1s action directly concerned national politics. 
In Beaune, on 27 June 1956, fifty or sixty ~oujadists blocked the 
entrance of a store owned by a rival deputy; police arrested two 
of the demonstrators as they cleared the way. By that time, the 
UDCA had enough visibility to attract Communist counter- 
demonstrator~ -- and thus pitched battles -- to many of its 
meetings. 
Pou jadists never had much success in mobilizing farmers. 
That is mildly surprising, since the 1950s saw a great surge of 
rural mobilization. In common with the tactics of Dorgeres and 
Poujade, organized farmers took to direct action on a scale 
rivaling that of 1907. They not only held the conventional 
meetings, marches, and demonstrations, but also staged tractor 
parades, blocke? roads, occupied public places, and dumped surplus 
produce in the streets, On 1 February 1955, some 15,000 farmers 
from the Nord and Pas-de-Calais gathered at' the trade fair in 
Lille. They demanded government help in lowering costs and 
entering foreign markets and protested governmental restrictions 
on beet sugar. When they marched toward the prefecture from the 
war monument and broke through police barricades, riot police 
fought them, using tear gas to break up the crowd. 
During the following days, farmers blocked roads in the Nord 
and Pas-de-Calais to dramatize their case. outside of Bethune, 
farmers who were blockading the city unhitched their horses and 
drove them against the police. Near ~ouai, their confreres met to 
pass out 12 tons of potatoes. The action in the north resonated 
elsewhere in France, During the first two weeks of February 1955, 
farmers blocked roads in the Ile de France,, Beauce, Normandy, 
Brittany, and Languedoc, The demonstrators in ~6rault and Gard 
not only stopped motorists, but gave them free wine. Soon the 
distribution or dumping.of underpriced produce became a standard 
feature of farmers9 actions. 
Varying as a function of price swings and government policy, 
farmers' protests continued vigorously into the 1960s. In June 
1961, meetings, demonstrations, and road blockages multiplied 
through rural France in a great arc around from Provence to 
Normandy, with the Nord and Pas-de-Calais involved as well. 
Brittany had the most intense and concerted action. On 27 May, 
for instance, producers from around Pont-L9~bb6 dumped hundreds of 
kilograms of potatoes, marinated in tractor fuel, in the city 
streets. On 8 June: 
At about 2 A.M., the order was given to all members of the 
farmers1 union to go to Morlaix with their tractors or cars. 
At 5 A.M., 3 or 4 thousand farmers surrounded the city and 
blocked all the roads. A small number of them -- 300 or 400 
-- occupied the subprefecture (Mendras & Tavernier 1962: 
650). 
In fact, the demonstrators broke down the door and chased out the 
subprefect. Later, the subprefect and the prefect both refused to 
meet with them to discuss their demands for government help in 
marketing their meat and vegetables, The prefect said that 
"although he was ready to receive leaders of the agricultural 
trade that wanted to defend its interests, he could not receive 
demonstrators who that very morning had invaded the subprefecture" 
(Ouest-France 9 June 1961). That night' someone cut a dozen 
telephone lines serving the city. During the following days 
Brittany saw more phone lines severed, railroad tracks blocked, 
eggs dumped by the hundreds in streets, and many other acts of 
agrarian opposition. Farmers used a battering ram to break into 
the city hall of Pontivy. In far-off Moscow, Pravda printed a 
long article on French unrest featuring a photograph of that 
incident, and headlined it PAIN AND ANGER OF THE FRENCH 
COUNTRYSIDE. 
Meanwhile, other farmers rammed their way into the prefecture 
at Poitiers, A thousand farmers on tractors blockaded the 
vendgels prefecture at La Roche-sur-Yon. Around Toulouse, tractor 
parades blocked many roads. Toward the month's end, rural 
demonstrators surrounded ~e/ziers while others threw beams and 
trees across railroad tracks in the city's hinterland. The issues 
and actions varied from one region to another; their main common 
grounds were an orientation to the interests of farmers who had 
something to market, and a direction of the action to the national 
government. It was the broadest rural mobilization that had 
occurred since the insurrection of 1851. It changed government 
policy: In 1962, the so-called ~isani Charter established a series 
of incentives to smaller farmers who were willing to invest and 
innovate. 
If 1961 was a high point, it was not the end of rural action. 
A survey of the years from 1962 to 1971 catalogued an average of 
60 demonstrations per year, 13 of them violent. Over the decade, 
the reliable producers of farmers' demonsrations and related 
actions were Brittany, the Nord, Provence, and Languedoc. An 
impressive 59 percent of the events involved demands concerning 
government agricultural policy, and another 26 percent concerned 
prices. In the winegrowing regions of the South, "the struggle 
for a good price pairs with the fight against wine imports" (Pin01 
1975: 120). The potato growers of Nord and Pas-de-Calais and the 
vegetable growers of Brittany worried about prices, but saw a 
proper government agricultural policy -- including a measure of 
protection from competitors within the Common Market -- as the way 
to assure their well-being. 
By the 1970s, variants on the planned disruption of traffic 
had become a specialty of rural activists. On 20 July 1973, 
stockraisers near Brive dared to commit a sacrilege: to protest 
low wholesale meat prices, they blocked the road and delayed for 
an hour the departure of the great annual bicycle race, the Tour 
de France. The issues and precise techniques of rural contention 
varied from one producing region to another. Beyond the regional 
variation, however, rural collective action had two remarkable 
things in common: first, questions of'wages, tenure, or techniques 
of production mattered little as compared with control of prices 
and markets; second, it went almost without saying that the 
national state had the means and obligation to act on rural needs. 
Retaking Possession 
The twentieth century brought one central innovation to 
France's repertoires of contention: the seizure of a space, often 
including the persons within it, as a means of exerting pressure 
on people outside that space. Collective squatting in vacant 
dwellings, hi jackings, hostage-takings, sitdown strikes, 
occupations of public buildings all had that routine in. common. 
To be sure, those actions shared some properties with the erection 
of barricades to defend a neighborhood against outsiders; that 
practice already existed in 1648, and temporarily became a 
revolutionary way of life during the nineteenth century. The old 
agrarian routines of breaking down enclosures to pasture forbidden 
animals on former common land likewise acted out the claimed right 
to the space. Furthermore, the twentieth-century actions often 
began with a defensive gesture: blocking an eviction, avoiding a 
lockout, and so on: Yet twentieth-century people created an 
aggressive, offensive version o'f the occupation. That version 
asserted the occupants' right. to hold the premises, and used their 
control .of the space as the basis of demands on authorities who 
likewise claimed rights to the same space. .The combination .of 
occupation and'offensive bargaining marked off a set of practices 
wfth few precedents before World War I. 
The sitdown strikes of 1936 to 1939 and the extraordinary 
days of May and June 1968 brought the greatest clusters of 
deliberate seizures of spaces., But the practice became more 
common outside the great moments of rebellion as well. In .the 
1970s, workers occupied workplaces -- the Lip watch factory, 
 ita an-Coder, even the passenger liner France -- to keep them from 
closing down permanently, Workers attempted to operate a number 
of these concerns on their own, generally without great success. 
Outside of the great sensational cases, the occupation was 
generalizing to small, local conflicts. On 17 November 1981, 
about 250 employees of the little Myrys shoe factory of Limoux 
(Aude) struck against Louis Riu, owner and operator of the firm. 
They had asked for a reduction of the work week to 38 hours, for a 
slowing of the pace of production, and for early retirement at 55; 
Monsieur .Riu had refused, and proposed a 44-hour week without 
overtime in peak season, a 36-hour week in slack season, plus some 
alterations in vacation pay and schedules. As employees got the 
news at work on the 17th, 
They went at once to block departmental road 118 and started 
turning vehicles away from the factory. At the same time, 
unhappy at the refusal to negotiate, they blocked the exits 
from the executive offices. It was then 9:50 A.M.  M. Louis 
Riu, the boss, pushed his way through the thick picket line 
and got to his car, which was parked in the factory's 
courtyard. The car was immediately surrounded by about ten 
people, who kept it from leaving. M. ~ o u i s  ~ i u  got out of 
his car. After walking back across the courtyard, he, walked 
out onto a local road which winds along the nearby hills. 
The strange parade, led by a boss with his brief case, and 
consisting mainly of a colorful, noisy demonstration, 
continued to the middle of the vineyard, where the strikers 
stopped the head of their firm and started' a discussion. 
Neither the foggy location nor the morning hour favored 
genuine negotiations; they made a date for later, and the odd 
gathering dispersed as quickly as it had formed (Babou et al. 
1981: 27-29) . 
That afternoon the strikers, reinforced by delegations of strikers 
from other plants in nearby Carcassonne and Quillan, paraded 
through Limoux. The parade ended at the subprefecture, where the 
subprefect and the strikers agreed on a three-way discussion: 
workers - management - government. 
Those discussions led union representatives to call off the 
strike. The bulk of the workers, however, thought otherwise; they 
proposed to stay out, and to block deliveries to the plant. 
Strikers blocked the entrances to vehicles for two weeks, setting 
up a camp outside the plant. Non-strikers continued to work 
inside, but no raw materials entered and no finished shoes left. 
As workers occupied the delivery zone, they continued to 
parade, and sent delegations to see the prefect and the bishop. 
Limoux's city council voted them moral . and material support. 
Negotiations continued. On 2 December, management announced the 
layoff of the non-striking employees because "it is impossible to 
deliver raw materials and heating fuel, or to send out finished 
goods" (Babou et al. 1981). At the same time, management 
threatened those who blocked the plant'with legal action. But 
that was a late maneuver. On the morning of 4 December, 
management and strikers reached a settlement -- a 39-hour week 
with 40 hours' pay, plus most of the other demands. Workers had 
gained significantly by means of an action that was not quite a 
classic sitdown, nor yet a simple picket line, but a blend of the 
two. 
Occupying the premises, or part of them, was not always so 
successful. At the big ~albot automobile plant in the Paris 
suburb of ~oissy, owned by Peugeot, management planned in 1983 to 
meet declining sales by laying off about 3,000 workers. Under 
pressure from unions and government, they reduced the figure to 
1,905. The threatened workers, largely African immigrants, had no 
guarantee of reemployment. A sitdown by a few hundred of the 
laid-off workers, plus some of their comrades who still held jobs, 
led to. pitched battles within the factory. Strikers and 
non-strikers hurled bolts and other auto- parts at each other. On 
5 January delegates of the CFDT and CGT, unable to halt the 
fighting, ,agreed to the calling in of riot police. The plant 
gradually went back to work, filtering out the laid-off workers at 
its gates, as the government proposed lump-sum payments to 
immigrants who would return to their native lands. A Socialist 
government in a contracting economy found . itself with a 
sharply-divided labor movement. 
The occupation of space had also become a way of showing 
determination on behalf of a cause, without bargaining for 
departure from the space. About the time that the conflict at 
Talbot-Poissy was coming to a head, farmers in Brittany were once 
again demonstrating. During the first week of January, Breton 
farmers occupied the prefecture of Morbihan in Vannes, destroyed 
meat in the streets, and installed blockades on roads. These 
shows of strength backed up demands for government protection. By 
then, they were familiar routines. 
Indeed, much of January's action had a familiar visage. In 
his Paris dispatch of 24 January, Paul Lewis wrote that: 
Social unrest is increasing in France as workers and farmers 
continue to protest the ~overnmen't's new austerity policies. 
The protests are directed at Government plans to lay off 
thousands of workers in industries that are suffering losses, 
like steel and shipbuilding. And the discontent is also 
focused on programs to reduce inflation and cut the soaring 
cost of agricultural subsidies by paying farmers less for 
what they produce. Today, more than 3,000 workers from the 
Nord-Mediterranee group of shipyards marched through Paris to 
protest a plan that would eliminate up to 6,000 jobs. Angry 
farmers in northern France parked trucks and tractors on 
railroad tracks, blocking traffic to Paris in a continuation 
of their protest against low pork and poultry prices and 
low-priced imports. This week they have smashed local 
government offices, battled riot police and hijacked trucks 
bringing in pork sausages from Britain, the Netherlands and 
West Germany. In addition, five unions plan a general strike 
in the state-owned coal mines beginning Feb. 17 to protest 
6,000 expected job losses this year and up to 20,000 over the 
next three years, as the Government prepares to reduce coal 
I 
output. And steelworkers, angry that the Government has 
refused to bail out their industry, have skirmished with 
police in Alsace-Lorraine over the potential loss of 35,000 
jobs. Even Government workers are planning a "week of 
action" involving work stoppages and slowdowns (New York 
Times 25 January 1984). 
The conflicts of January followed the pattern of times of 
contraction: resistance to losses, demands for restitution, 
warnings not to touch existing rights and privileges. Contraction 
or expansion, however, public statements of demands and complaints 
repeatedly followed the same routines. By January 1984 most of 
those routines, in their essentials, had been operating for a 
century or more. 
GENERAL NOTE. The National Science Foundation and the Horace Rackham School of 
Graduate studies, University of ~ichigan, have supported the research reported in 
this paper. 
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